Prepared by: Amjad Ismail al-Agha
Edited by: Hakim Ahmad
Introduction
There is no doubt that the political complexity of the Syrian context necessitates careful, analytical approaches—particularly when addressing some of the most contentious and defining issues in Syria’s post-conflict landscape. Understanding the post-Assad phase requires an objective examination of emerging political frameworks, including the constitutional declaration, which has sparked both political polarization and pressing questions about the structure and future of a new Syrian state. This also applies to upcoming parliamentary elections and the president’s associated powers.
Given the unique and deeply complex nature of Syria’s political transition, it is crucial to develop approaches that focus on the foundational elements of the Constitutional Declaration issued on March 13, 2025. This declaration marks a significant development in the timeline of Syria’s political transformation, especially in the wake of the regime’s collapse. The urgency of establishing a new political reality is reflected in the declaration’s provisions, which ostensibly aim to lay the groundwork for political stability, a new constitution, and a functioning parliament. However, beneath the surface, many legal and political interpretations of the text raise serious concerns—suggesting the need for critical reviews to ensure its alignment with the demands of the transitional period, particularly regarding the formation of parliament and the avoidance of reconstituting authoritarianism under new guises. The process must also respect constitutional norms and legal standards throughout the evolving political landscape.
While the provisional constitutional declaration includes important provisions—such as criminalizing separatist calls, foreign intervention, the formation of armed factions, or support for crimes committed by the former regime—it remains far from establishing a democratic system. Instead, it consolidates executive power in the hands of the president, granting him the authority to appoint one-third of the members of the People’s Assembly, while the remaining two-thirds are selected by a committee that is itself appointed by the president.
Moreover, the parliament is deprived of any real oversight or accountability powers over the executive branch, which grants the system an unmistakably authoritarian character. The president retains broad powers reminiscent of autocratic regimes, particularly in light of the parliament’s limited role, restrictions on legislation, and the controlled process of member appointments—all of which point to a lack of parliamentary independence when compared to functioning democratic systems.
