DeFacto
On March 22, the DeFacto Platform for Dialogue held a closed discussion session in Qamishli, northeastern Syria, to address pressing issues related to the ongoing transitional phase in Syria. The session focused on evaluating the performance of the country’s new leadership and analyzing the agreement signed between Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Commander in Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi.
Despite differences in perspectives, the session—attended by civil society activists, media professionals, and political party representatives—highlighted concerns over the lack of transparency surrounding the transitional process. Participants expressed optimism following the fall of the Assad regime in December but cautioned about the challenges ahead.
Insights on the Syrian Landscape
Participants questioned the long-standing slogan of “Syrian unity,” arguing that historical realities suggest otherwise. Many noted that different communities and regions have remained largely unfamiliar with each other, with interactions often limited to education, healthcare, or employment rather than fostering genuine social cohesion.
Political frameworks and civil society organizations were urged to maintain optimism regarding the collapse of Assad’s authoritarian regime while working to establish effective channels of communication between the people and the new authorities.
Discussions also addressed emerging extremism, violations witnessed in the coastal areas, and the rise of hate speech, which has intensified fears of regional fragmentation. The role of Turkish and Israeli interventions in prolonging the conflict and fueling mass violence was also debated. Participants acknowledged that structured political activism in northeastern Syria has played a key role in preventing internal strife and sectarian discord.
While acknowledging the current uncertainties, attendees agreed that the demise of Assad’s regime has opened new avenues for all Syrians.
The Path of the New Government
A majority of participants agreed that early indicators of the transitional phase have been discouraging. The National Dialogue Conference lacked broad and genuine representation, and the constitutional declaration faced criticism from multiple parties. This raised concerns about whether the formation of the new government and parliament would follow the same flawed approach.
Participants suggested that the new authorities are struggling to adapt to Syria’s diverse sociopolitical landscape. Despite calls for national unity, there are fears that the country may be heading toward centralized rule under a single authority, accompanied by increasing religious conservatism.
The transitional administration initially emphasized competence over political inclusivity but later appointed loyalists under the pretext of expertise. This approach was widely criticized during the National Dialogue Conference and the constitutional announcement. The absence of an active civil or political movement, coupled with restrictive measures on existing organizations, has further complicated the transition. Civil society organizations are being pressured to re-register, while political parties remain unable to obtain official recognition.
Some analysts suggested that the transitional leadership, under President Ahmad al-Sharaa, may continue to embrace rigid and unilateral governance, given its ties to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Others argued that if representatives were chosen realistically, with fair representation of ethnic and religious communities, the country could move toward a more legitimate transitional process. Economic factors were also highlighted as a key test for the new government, with concerns over mass dismissals of employees and experts without viable replacements.
One participant emphasized the urgent need for a genuine national dialogue that includes all segments of Syrian society. A transitional ruling council should be established to shift governance from the current presidential system to a parliamentary one.
A Critical Perspective on al-Sharaa–Abdi Agreement
Some attendees viewed the agreement between al-Sharaa and Abdi as a crucial step toward ending the war and initiating a new phase, as reflected in a more positive public sentiment and a decline in hate speech. However, the decision for northeastern Syria to participate in the new administration, rather than oppose it outright, was a point of debate.
Beyond the agreement, no clear commitments have been made by the new authorities in Damascus regarding fundamental freedoms, the rights of displaced persons, or the future of areas occupied by Turkey. Even positive developments in Afrin have been minimal. Some participants suggested that if implemented effectively, the agreement’s provisions could pave the way for justice and inclusivity, helping to address the current transitional shortcomings.
Criticism of the agreement centered on three major violations: the continued military aggression against northeastern Syria, ongoing violence in the coastal areas, and the constitutional declaration’s failure to align with the agreement’s principles. There were also concerns about the lack of transparency in key provisions, particularly regarding governance structures and the role of civil society in both government-controlled and SDF-held territories.
Key Recommendations
- Failure of the new government to uphold international human rights commitments would reinforce authoritarianism rather than foster institutional development and genuine national progress.
- Transitional justice should be prioritized to alleviate societal tensions and prevent future conflicts.
- Civil society and political engagement must be revitalized. The positive response to the al-Sharaa–Abdi agreement underscores the need for broader dialogue.
- The success of agreements depends on minimizing Turkish and Israeli interference or involving more constructive international actors.
- Internal governance in northeastern Syria must be reformed, particularly in regions like Hasakah, Raqqa, Kobani, Tabqa, and Deir ez-Zor, by strengthening institutional frameworks and public services.
- The upcoming intra-Kurdish dialogue should be safeguarded from external manipulations and personal or regional interests.
- If the situation deteriorates and alternatives are exhausted, activists should mobilize for renewed protests and advocacy campaigns.
- Implementing ceasefire provisions, integrating governmental institutions, and facilitating the return of displaced persons could provide an opportunity for civil society to play a greater role, helping the government enhance its collaborative efforts in the early months of transition.
